This talk looks back at the maturation of cybersecurity in the automotive industry from early anti-theft systems to the use of technical measures to protect electronic vehicle systems up to today’s requirements regarding technical and organizational measures to protect current vehicles against attacks. The talk reports on experiences from this maturing process as well as current and future challenges. Technical but also organizational trends will be highlighted and discussed in the conflict resulting from an increasing rigidity of concrete (regulatory) requirements on the one hand and the required degree of freedom for the development of alternative solutions on the other hand. Empirical success criteria and high dynamics regarding environmental conditions for automotive cybersecurity will be one focus area of the discussion.

ISO/SAE 21434:2021 discusses the calculation of the Attack Feasibility Rating through various methods, including the CVSS-based approach and the Attack Potential (AP)-based approach.

During the concept and development phases (e.g., TARA), the more detailed Attack Potential approach finds widespread use. Conversely, the CVSS-based approach continues to dominate continual cybersecurity activities due to the availability of public vulnerability database ratings based on CVSS. As both CVSS and Attack Potential approaches have their respective advantages and applications, it is evident that the coexistence of these methods will persist.

However, our concrete project experiences have revealed that the application of different approaches does not consistently yield identical results, even when considering the same attack paths. This disparity becomes particularly problematic when trying to integrate CVSS-based information into Risk Value calculations originally designed for the Attack Potential-based approach. Until this issue is addressed in upcoming releases of ISO/SAE 21434, the industry requires a solution to maintain a holistic product cybersecurity risk and vulnerability management approach throughout the entire product lifecycle. Therefore, there is a pressing need for a stable and consistent conversion methodology between the Attack Potential and CVSS-based approaches.

This presentation aims to explain the differentiation between the CVSS-based and Attack Potential approaches, highlighting their individual advantages and disadvantages. It also acknowledges the continued significance of both approaches in Road Vehicles Cybersecurity Engineering and proposes conversion methods. These are then elaborated with detailed calculations, and examples are provided to demonstrate the consistency of the results.

This talk will explore the challenges and benefits of integrating automated end-to-end security testing into the automotive development lifecycle. It will discuss solutions for infrastructure, asynchronous messages, fast-changing backends, and emerging technologies to meet UN R155 criteria.

The industry generally acknowledges that Ultra Wide Band (UWB) technology can theoretically mitigate relay attacks targeting traditional Low Frequency (LF) and Bluetooth Passive Keyless Entry (PKE) systems. UWB localization technology has been increasingly incorporated into the latest digital car key systems, so the functionality of UWB ranging is directly tied to the car’s susceptibility to relay attacks and the proper operation of the car key. However, during a security test project at GoGoByte, we discovered that merely adhering to the IEEE 802.15.4z and Car Connectivity Consortium (CCC) Digital Key standards does not ensure the reliable performance of the UWB ranging function. We have proposed a “sniper” jamming attack on High Rate Pulse (HRP) UWB ranging. For confidentiality reasons, we used the iPhone 14 and AirTag as demonstration devices and created an attack device called GoGoBark. Once GoGoBark is activated, the UWB-based ranging function of the iPhone fails, with a success rate of 99%. This attack method impacts not only Apple smartphones but also digital car keys that utilize IEEE 802.15.4z HRP UWB ranging.

This talk paints the picture of the challenges the automotive industry is facing in the era of software-defined vehicles (SDVs) where software security suffers from the tragedy of the commons. Coverage-guided fuzzing has proven to be very effective in finding security-relevant bugs in software. Despite a large slew of open-source tools, applying coverage-guided fuzzing to automotive software still has a high entry barrier for adoption. To alleviate the challenge, this talk presents system and module-level fuzzing approaches to lower the entry barrier for fuzzing automotive software. To make the approaches tangible, short live demonstrations of the system and module fuzzing approaches will be presented.

Over-the-Air Software Update is widely used by Car OEMs to ensure maintenance of Vehicles Software through regular updates containing either bug fixes, vulnerability patches or introduction of new features or functionalities throughout vehicle serial-life on Connected Vehicles.

Introduction of ISO/SAE-21434 standard and UNR.155/UNR.156 regulations have largely contributed to helping OEMs and Suppliers at standardizing methodologies within engineering flows and processes while impacting security architecture. This initial step could largely be extended in the future and become even more beneficial to Vehicle end-users since security serves common objectives for all OEMs and automotive suppliers with ultimate winners being end-users with more secure products running in our streets. Knowledge sharing should be encouraged to continue to strive for continuous improvements.

Goal of this session is to share current strategies & methodologies used at Renault to enhance Security Architecture on future SDV platforms and cope with the challenges of updating very frequently multiple execution environments including sensitive automotive functions while still controlling security risks.

This presentation will be a live demonstration of an incident response Tabletop Exercise, designed to outline the benefits of conducting exercises within businesses and governments and provide attendees with firsthand experience of what an event like this would entail.

The exercise will be interactive with the audience, relying on them to help drive the incident through each stage of the process:

Identify
Triage
Validate
Mitigate
Disclose

This will be a fictional incident for a fictional company/device not targeted to the automotive industry, with some actionable tips to enhance or establish incident response tabletops within private and public organizations.

Having been involved in the automotive cybersecurity industry since early 2017, Kamel has gotten to experience the growth of the field firsthand. Over the years, the industry has changed greatly, with industry standards and legislation coming to completion, the emergence of different groups and organizations, books specific to the subject of automotive security published, and more. In this talk, Kamel will recount his time in the industry, answering many of the most common questions he receives from newcomers to the industry eager to find guidance on how to navigate it.

For the last six years, Upstream has been carefully monitoring and analyzing automotive and smart mobility cybersecurity incidents and risks.

In addition to an extensive report published annually, last year we added a new mid-year version of the report – focusing on major trends we identified recently that drive new attack vectors and risks.

In our latest H1’2023 report we identified three significant trends that directly derive from the SDV transformation the industry is undergoing:

1. Steep rise in backend server attacks – enabling access to sensitive vehicle data and controls
2. The critical role of continuous SBOM analysis (dynamic TARA) and how it can be utilized to boost threat intelligence
3. Agriculture, construction, and heavy machinery vehicles – new targets by malicious are being targeted by threat actors – these SDVs are more susceptible than ever to cybersecurity threats

In this session, we’ll dive deep into the opportunities delivered by SDVs, and help assess the emerging cybersecurity threats. We’ll provide insights on recent incidents and discovered vulnerabilities in 2023, and how OTA – which are at the heart of SDV transformation – are also a very effective mitigation tool.

As the automotive industry embraces cutting-edge technology, the need for robust security measures becomes paramount. This presentation delves into our research, which involved successfully hacking thousands of heavy vehicles and shines a spotlight on the significant challenges encountered during the vulnerability disclosure process.

In this talk, we present a novel method for exploiting vulnerabilities in secure embedded bootloaders, which are the foundation of trust for modern vehicle software systems. Specifically, we demonstrate the feasibility of code execution attacks by leveraging a combination of software and hardware weaknesses in the secure software update process of electronic control units (ECUs), which is standardized across the automotive industry. Our method utilizes an automated approach, eliminating the need for static code analysis, and utilizes a novel algorithm for identifying fault injection parameters, enabling code execution in a matter of minutes to hours. Additionally, we demonstrate the ability to perform information leakage and program execution tracing through fault injection on PowerPC and ARM processors, which are commonly used in safety-critical applications. These experiments were conducted using electromagnetic fault injection techniques, without any hardware modifications to the targeted systems. Our results indicate that the standardized secure software update process currently used in the automotive industry is in need of revision in light of the security risks demonstrated.

This presentation explores the crucial role of Software Bill of Materials (SBOMs) in automobile cybersecurity, given the increased vulnerability due to connected cars and autonomous vehicles. SBOMs help identify security risks and vulnerabilities in the software supply chain of vehicles. We discuss challenges in obtaining SBOMs, contractual issues, and suppliers’ limited knowledge. We showcase tools for SBOM management/generation and draw lessons from successful implementations in other industries. Targeted at cybersecurity professionals, automobile industry leaders, and policymakers, this session highlights the significance of SBOMs in enhancing automobile cybersecurity.

The story of the investigation into the device that I believe was used to steal my 2021 Toyota RAV4 and how easy it is to do using ‘CAN Injection ‘ most details are in the following blog post-https://kentindell.github.io/2023/04/03/can-injection/

This presentation aims to give you an overview of the various initiatives that are propelling automotive cybersecurity forward. We will provide a roadmap of important topics and the organizations necessary to be successful.

During our discussion, we will explore the efforts made in the field of automotive cybersecurity, emphasizing their importance and the effects they have. We will also look at the latest advancements and industry trends, discussing how they are shaping the future of automotive security. Furthermore, we will stress the essential steps that the community needs to take in order to proactively prepare for the constantly changing threat landscape.

In this panel, we will explore the maturity for CSMS implementations across the automotive industry, and how it varies in different markets. We will discuss the most common process gaps and key challenges that OEMs and Suppliers face during audits, and how they can better prepare for them. Our high-profile Panelists will share their insights and experiences from an auditor’s perspective.

PANEL MODERATOR:
Dr. Jetzabel M. Serna-Olvera is the CEO and Co-founder of SAPAR GmbH, bringing over 18 years of global cybersecurity expertise. With a PhD in cybersecurity from the Universitat Politécnica de Catalunya, BarcelonaTech, she has excelled in various roles. Dr. Serna-Olvera began as a software engineer at the Tijuana City Council and went on to become a security researcher at esCERT-UPC. She further contributed as a senior security intelligence researcher at LaCaixa Bank and an assistant professor at the Goethe University of Frankfurt. In the automotive industry, she made strides as a cybersecurity strategist, advisor, and security culture lead at leading companies including Continental, Robert Bosch GmbH, and Geely. Her focus areas encompass Vulnerability Management, Incident Response, Threat Intelligence, and fostering a Cybersecurity Culture. Additionally, her extensive knowledge of privacy-enhancing technologies, GDPR compliance, and privacy-centric machine learning drives her mission of simplifying cybersecurity and privacy, cultivating expertise, and integrating them into core business operations.

The talk focuses on the discovery of invaluable data captured in infotainment modules suspected of crashing, which can aid serious crime or collision investigations. This data is often found in Diagnostic Log Trace (DLT) files associated with the AUTOSAR (Automotive Open System Architecture) standardisation initiative for automotive electronic control units (ECUs).

The AUTOSAR framework enables modular development and software component reuse across different automotive platforms, reducing development costs and improving system quality and safety. The DLT file format within AUTOSAR logs and traces diagnostic and software event information in ECUs, providing a standardised way of analysing and diagnosing issues.

The DLT files have been observed to contain data such as entered destinations, tracklogs (GPS fixes), connected devices, connected phonebooks, connection times, engine on/off events, and odometer readings. However, the conditions under which these DLT files are created and their exact sources remain unclear to the Vehicle Systems Forensics community.

The presenter shares their personal experience with one vehicle equipped with systems capable of storing DLT files. They acquired data from the infotainment system using various techniques and are currently conducting ongoing testing to understand the creation and content of these files fully.

The ultimate goal of this research is to enable vehicle systems forensics investigators to better comprehend DLT files and the associated data for existing vehicles and ongoing criminal investigations. Additionally, it aims to raise awareness among automotive cybersecurity professionals about the potential risks of personal data captured within infotainment systems via this protocol and the need for enhanced data security in the future.

We will discuss strategies to automatically generate the Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) of connected devices as a foundation for effective vulnerability management. SBOMs provide a comprehensive list of all software components and their dependencies in a given system – a prerequisite to identifying vulnerabilities and their potential impact. Additionally, we will delve into some intricacies and challenges when dealing with SBOM.

To avoid alert fatigue, we will further demonstrate effective strategies to automate impact assessments of vulnerabilities to filter false positives and increase the relevance of reported vulnerabilities using both open-source solutions as well as commercial services.

Attendees will gain insight into how automated SBOM generation and management can improve vulnerability management processes, reduce risks, and increase the efficiency of the product security lifecycle.

Culture, a word without hard facts, it is more about feeling. So, what is meant by that? When it comes to the specific establishment of a cybersecurity culture, we are talking about quite an unclear challenge. ISO/SAE 21434:2021 presupposes the fostering and maintenance of a strong cybersecurity culture as one of the prerequisites for developing cyber secure products. But the standard leaves the implementation of that requirement open. Additionally, it affects not only the cybersecurity team but also the whole organization. This means completely different company divisions and teams with very different backgrounds and work spheres, often distributed across many locations, are involved.

The purpose of this presentation is to show how cybersecurity culture can be addressed in different phases of the product lifecycle and propose concrete measures to strengthen that in your company.

In conclusion, the presentation discusses how to measure a proper culture and provide evidence to an auditor or technical service.

The technologies in hacking connected cars have not only advanced but also become more accessible to cybercriminals recently. They can now purchase “black box” tools that allow them to quickly overcome anti-theft technologies incorporated in modern vehicles without fully understanding CAN bus and other, similar communication protocols.

As demonstrated in Pwn2Own Vancouver 2023, malicious actors could level up by staging a complex attack scenario by combining multiple vulnerabilities — such as a time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) issue and a heap overflow and out-of-bounds write zero-day vulnerability in the in-vehicle infotainment (IVI) system — to control a Tesla Model 3 remotely.2 Compared to already known exploits on weak key fob cryptography and relay attacks, malicious activities like this are far more advanced and underscore the importance of further securing today’s vehicles against such imminent threats.

In this presentation, we will address the following questions:

– What has driven cybercriminals to be more brazen and attacks to be more sophisticated?

– How will cybercriminals monetize these advanced automo=ve vulnerabilities?

– Where could the next stages of cyberattacks come from emerging trends in automotive vulnerabilities, new attack vectors, and future targets?

– What are the industry’s counterattacks to stay ahead of a rapidly changing automotive threat
landscape?

Combination of TARAs on different levels (system and software). How to perform on those levels, using the example of architectural vulnerability analysis for Electronic Steering Column Lock function to identify cybersecurity controls.

Car hacking has been a hot topic in the security community since 2015. In the years since, vehicle OEMs and suppliers put significant effort towards protecting vehicle users from cyber security incidents. However, the journey towards secure cars is far from the end, as modern vehicles’ complexity and connectivity introduce new challenges.

This talk will communicate the specific experience of the PCAutomotive team conducting vehicle security research, covering all the steps starting with intelligence gathering to the vulnerability disclosure process. The talk will tell our story – the way we perform our black-box research, using the latest SKODA SUPERB III car, as an example.

The specific vulnerabilities found and covered in the talk will include unintended debug functionality, hard-coded passwords, weak protection of the diagnostic services, as well as information disclosure issues in the backend server API. The talk will demonstrate how insufficient protection of in-vehicle diagnostic services may result in safety issues for drivers.

The purpose of the talk is to share our experience with manufacturers and their internal security teams, automotive developers, and the general car security community – all to further secure our streets.

As automotive software organizations push security earlier in the development processes, what can or should regular software or operations engineers know about security? Taking as given that we need them to build secure systems, that demands a shared understanding of the security issues that might come up, and agreement on what that body of knowledge might entail. Without this knowledge, they’ll keep building insecure systems. With them, we can have fewer recurring problems that are trivially attackable.

This session will detail the latest UNECE cybersecurity regulations, comparing the automotive sector to other industry benchmarks. However, regulation is not a fix-all solution and its limitations will also be highlighted – alongside an introduction into the technologies on the market which can help achieve compliance and a strong cybersecurity posture.

Merging several functions (including safety-related vision and infotainment) into a single piece of silicon is the next SDV trend. Those approaches have many benefits but also raise significant security & safety challenges.

Ampere will dig into the details of the market offering, in an unprecedented overview of next-gen system-on-chip architectures, and will explain a few examples of security defects in such architectures, leading to life-threatening safety issues.

Let’s see what technological alignments are still needed for those solutions to be beneficial, without compromising the safety of road users.

This presentation aims to provide an explanation and practical interpretation on the topic of Targeted Attack Feasibility (TAF, specified by ISO/SAE AWI PAS 8475). TAF is a concept that serves as a harmonized approach for managing cyber risks in the vehicle industry with security controls differing from a standard solution for any reason (e.g. usage of special technologies, or securing legacy architecture). For this reason, the presentation will provide useful insight into this topic for any participant of the transportation industry supply chain.

We’re all familiar with the term “Zero-Day Vulnerabilities” but have you ever wondered what kinds are found in real-time embedded automotive systems today? Our penetration testing team reverse-engineers many ECUs from clients, uncovering zero-day vulnerabilities in components like TCUs, BCMs, Instrument Clusters, Airbags, and other safety-critical systems. In this talk, we will present and detail four distinct vulnerabilities we found and disclosed, highlighting the complexity and variety of security issues, and concluding with lessons learned and strategies for mitigation.

Explore the unique cybersecurity challenges faced by Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE) and why traditional approaches fall short. This session will highlight the necessity for a collaborative strategy to address evolving threats and enhance the security of EV infrastructure. Discover the innovative approaches needed to secure this crucial component of the electric vehicle ecosystem.

This talk explores the recent vulnerabilities in EV charging networks, focusing on how threat actors could exploit these weaknesses to cause large-scale blackouts. By examining critical issues in EV chargers, Charging Station Management Systems (CSMS), and external integrations, we aim to guide EV charging site operators, manufacturers, regulators, and security professionals in implementing robust cybersecurity measures to safeguard our grid infrastructure around the world.

This presentation addresses solutions for mitigating critical vulnerabilities in automotive keyless entry systems. Our approach combines challenge-response authentication with timestamp verification to prevent relay and replay attacks that enable vehicle theft. We introduce the theoretical foundations of this concept, which builds upon existing techniques and is still in the idea stage.

Why a systematic empowerment of the Cybersecurity Manager is more beneficial than just randomly targeting personal and company certifications. Real-world approaches that combine cybersecurity with leadership principles, people management, education, and processes.

As the automotive industry undergoes a paradigm shift towards software-defined vehicles, the imperative for robust software security becomes obvious. This talk explores the nuanced landscape of identifying, managing, and preventing vulnerabilities early in the product lifecycle from the perspective of an OEM software company. The talk also highlights the role of standardized formats like software bill of materials (SBOMs) and anticipates future challenges such as crypto agility and the use of cryptographic bills of materials (CBOMs).

Understanding and mitigating weak links in the automotive supply chain is crucial for comprehensive vehicle cybersecurity. This presentation explores the necessity of Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) at all supply chain levels and offers practical guidance for enhancing collaboration and security integration across OEMs and suppliers.

In a typical situation, a supplier (Tier-1, Tier-2, …) is asked to perform “own” TARAs on their level. In the end, the results have to be consistent with the vehicle TARA. Cybersecurity requirements coming from customers have to be evaluated against Cybersecurity Requirements derived from supplier TARA. Approaches of the structural view will be presented.

As connected and autonomous vehicles advance, the automotive industry faces increasingly complex cyber threats.
This presentation highlights today’s most common threats and explores how to effectively integrate Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) into security operations. Our live demo during this session will also showcase how OpenCTI enhances security posture, streamlines incident response, and drives efficiency.

This presentation explores the technique employed to perform a forensic acquisition of a publicly obtained Mercedes-Benz NTG6 infotainment module, the methods used to analyse data, revealing Personally Identifiable Information (PII) such as connected devices, phonebook records, call logs, and navigation data, stored without encryption or authentication, resulting in the extraction of vehicle user information using custom Python programming, highlighting privacy concerns in connected vehicles, where PII information such as location history, driving behavior, contact lists and more could be misused. This project identifies the types and extent of PII retrievable from modern vehicles, analyses manufacturer practices, and assesses adherence to regulations. Finally, it recommends measures to enhance privacy safeguards in connected vehicles.

KEYNOTE PRESENTATION:

In the rapidly evolving automotive cybersecurity landscape, engineering teams face increasing security challenges, particularly with software-defined vehicles. Securing these complex, interconnected automotive systems is becoming more difficult as adversaries enhance their capabilities.

This talk explores critical automotive security challenges from three different perspectives: technical security, process compliance, and
human resources. We will discuss why merely meeting minimum- security standards is inadequate and why raising the bar is essential.
Best practices for achieving higher security will be shared across these three areas.

The talk will then explore the growing role of Generative AI in strengthening security efforts, accelerating the execution of the secure engineering lifecycle, and improving overall work quality, effectively raising the security bar. Finally, we will provide insights into the future of this technology and how the industry can stay ahead of emerging cybersecurity threats.

Let’s assume that privacy (the right to be left alone) is a fundamental human right. As we know, there is data protection regulations worldwide which are supposed to be reflected, specifically, in business models and application domains relying on personalization. In the automotive domain this causes conflicts of interests.

The panel gives an overview of the state of the art of personalization and the corresponding Personally Identifiable Information needed in automotive applications and mobility services and discusses the level of privacy which has been introduced so far. Since there is always room for improvement the panel also gives advice and recommendations for OEMs, Tier1s, service providers, and passengers across the data life cycle to meet compliance and beyond.

MODERATOR: Mario Hoffman
Group Lead Cyber Security, ARRK Engineering GmbH

PANELIST:
Andrea Amico
Founder & CEO, Privacy4Cars

Misha Rykov
Independent Investigative Researcher

PD Dr. Sebastian Pape
Security & Privacy Manager, Continental Automotive Technologies GmbH

Following our previous paper presented at the 2023 Secure our Streets (SoS), titled “A Practical Transformation Proposal between Attack Potential-based and CVSS-based Attack Feasibility Ratings,” we received significant positive feedback and numerous requests for an update incorporating the new CVSS 4.0 standard, which was released at the end of 2023. Recognizing the importance of this new standard, we propose a practical method to integrate CVSS 4.0 into the systematic analysis framework of ISO/SAE 21434. Given that CVSS 4.0 is not yet included in ISO/SAE 21434, our work aims to bridge this gap and provide a robust approach for enhancing attack feasibility assessments within the automotive cybersecurity domain.

In today’s world, software-defined vehicles require continuous development even after production. Releasing feature and security enhancements via OTA updates is the new normal for many automotive OEMs. However, doing this efficiently while managing complexity and risk is often a struggle.

In this talk, we’ll cover how your organization can:

– Accelerate product development & minimize risks
– Ensure transparency in software development
– Enhance vulnerability analysis & risk management
– Build effective partnerships for innovation

There is some debate as to how SBOMs can enhance vulnerability management practices, and some believe that collecting SBOMs from internal teams or suppliers is too difficult and time-consuming. Learn how Schneider Electric has collected thousands of our product SBOMs and how we are leveraging the SBOMs as part of our corporate product CERT to quickly analyze and focus our attention when time is of importance. This presentation describes how we modified our policies and processes to collect, generate, and store thousands of SBOMs. You will hear how we have leveraged SBOMs during the Log4j and OpenSSL vulnerability events. Then we will conclude with key learnings, suggestions, and opportunities for improvement.

This presentation addresses the critical need for dynamic risk analysis in automotive cybersecurity, focusing on emerging threats to connected vehicles and mobility ecosystems. Real-world examples will demonstrate the importance of integrating TARA, threat intelligence, and live monitoring in a continuous, proactive feedback loop across the automotive cybersecurity stack.

In an era where mobility systems are rapidly evolving with advancements in technology, the integration of safety and security has become paramount. This presentation will delve into the critical need for a cohesive approach to safety and security analysis, addressing the challenges and opportunities in modern mobility systems. We will explore the latest innovations, methodologies, and best practices that are shaping the future of transportation safety. By driving forward the conversation on integrated safety and security, this presentation aims to equip stakeholders with the insights and tools necessary to build more resilient and secure mobility systems for the future.

This presentation explores how machine learning (ML) techniques can transform ISO/SAE 21434’s reactive framework into a dynamic, proactive one. By leveraging ML algorithms for anomaly detection, predictive risk assessment, and automated threat detection, the framework can provide continuous, data-driven cybersecurity solutions.

ISO/SAE 21434 serves as a foundational standard in automotive cybersecurity, yet it suffers from gaps, including its reactive approach to identified threats, reliance on static risk assessments, and dependence on manual risk evaluations. These gaps expose vehicles to emerging cyber threats. This paper explores how machine learning (ML) techniques, such as Anomaly Detection, Predictive Risk Assessment, Automated Threat Detection can transform ISO/SAE 21434’s reactive framework into a dynamic, proactive one. By leveraging threat catalog, ML models can continuously learn from vehicle data, identifying anomalies and integrating external cybersecurity intelligence to predict and mitigate emerging threats. This integration not only enhances the ISO/SAE 21434 framework but also provides proactive, automated, and data-driven cybersecurity solutions. By embedding ML into the ISO/SAE 21434 framework, the automotive industry can fortify its resilience against evolving cyber risks, ensuring a safer and more secure vehicle environment.

This presentation elaborates on secure isolation as a substantial element of a secure architecture. It especially focuses on the realization of isolation in software using operating systems and hypervisors and the challenges of providing HSM services to multiple VMs.

Performing Threat and Risk Assessments (TARA) while relying on static documentation poses challenges in addressing the evolving landscape of threats, characterised by increasingly sophisticated attackers and dynamic threat vectors. To address this issue, this presentation explores the utilisation of large language models (LLMs) to generate novel threat scenarios and corresponding mitigation techniques, to make TARA’s dynamic, based on attacks identified on in-vehicle networks and making them contextual.

During the inaugural Pwn2Own Automotive 49 unique zero-day vulnerabilities were discovered, affecting various connected car systems and components – including infotainment dashboards, operating systems, and electric vehicle (EV) chargers. We are discussing most common entry points, some details of the findings and how the industry should respond.

Software containers should simplify updateability and create cost savings in the electrical and electronic (E/E) architecture. But does it provide the same or even stronger promises on cybersecurity?

Automotive functions are hosted in electronic control units (ECUs) and operated within a complex network within the vehicle. There are current efforts to centralize ECU functions from dedicated ECUs into centralized platforms. One driver is the UN regulation R156 with ISO 24089, which requires car manufacturers to address updateability.

The trend to restructure the E/E architecture to feature centralized high-performance computers (HPCs) can be observed in the industry. The HPC is intended to run several ECU functions in parallel on a common platform. Concepts like the Adaptive AUTOSAR enable vendors to host the functions in the form of processes on a POSIX platform. Using Linux as an operating system has also included cloud experts such as Red Hat and Canonical to enter the domain. Their reference architectures show HPCs running Linux, which can host vehicle functions in software containers.

This concept is not new and has already been executed in the IT domain for a magnitude of software solutions. In the past dedicated servers have been transformed into software containers running on centralized servers and later in distributed infrastructures of the clouds. This development was also accompanied by a high number of security vulnerabilities. Those vulnerabilities can be attributed to the software containers themselves as well as the orchestrator software such as Docker or Kubernetes.

The automotive use cases for container technologies also open up new challenges: the use of physical interfaces and non-IP bus systems, such as the CAN bus, is uncommon in the IT world and therefore new territory. Also, the communication from containers to on-board interfaces of the platform, such as SPI, could jeopardize the security system.

This talk gives an overview of past vulnerabilities in software containers as well as new challenges introduced by the automotive use cases. The outcome should be lessons learned in container security for suppliers and OEMs.

In-vehicle and other data from connected, autonomous vehicles are critical to support research and applications in intelligent transportation. The University of Memphis, Colorado State University, and USC Information Sciences Institute, along with commercial telematics service provider Geotab, are building the Platform for Innovative use of Vehicle Open Telematics (PIVOT), a community-based platform intended to catalyze the production and consumption of automotive and heavy-duty datasets and associated tools to support the computer science, engineering, and other communities pursuing research in vehicle cybersecurity, intelligent transportation, and smart and connected communities. This talk will provide an overview of the PIVOT platform and summarize community feedback and key findings from a recent PIVOT workshop.

Secure Our Streets 2025

This presentation explores the evolution of product cybersecurity requirements in the automotive industry, highlighting the influence of emerging regulations such as UN ECE R.155 and standards like ISO/SAE 21434 on the cybersecurity landscape.

It also addresses the complexities and challenges arising from contractual obligations across the automotive value chain and offers practical recommendations for reducing this complexity through better alignment between regulatory, technical, and commercial requirements.

Asymmetric cryptography is now in widespread use, but algorithms that are secure today will be broken by the quantum computers of tomorrow. Most of todays and upcoming automotive security measures (e. g. ECU integrity protection, secure onboard communication, V2X, access control etc.) rely on classical cryptography that will be vulnerable. Although a breakthrough in quantum computing might be years away, companies need to prepare for the smooth transition to quantum-secure systems. Finding suitable post-quantum algorithms and migrating to quantum-secure systems can pose many challenges. This presentation aims to facilitate the understanding of challenges in the migration to post-quantum cryptography and describe viable solutions based on existing research. First, post-quantum algorithms and their impact on functions and protocols are analyzed under consideration of ongoing standardization processes and migration research projects. After that, the considerable differences between algorithms based on practical examples and benchmarks on common automotive hardware targets, e.g., Aurix TC375, are described. In the practical examples we focus on the lattice-based algorithms Falcon and Dilithium and briefly point out differences from other mathematical primitives. Furthermore, practical solutions for migration of Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs) are illustrated and respective advantages and disadvantages are discussed. The various categories of crypto agility are presented to highlight the wide scope of methods in this field. At the end, a general strategy for migration is proposed that considers the general uncertainty about the quantum threat by planning ahead and increases the trust in novel post-quantum algorithms by the implementation of suitable solutions.

The rapid integration of connected technologies in modern vehicles has introduced significant cybersecurity challenges, particularly in securing critical systems against advanced threats such as IP spoofing and rule manipulation. This study investigates the application of CHERI (Capability Hardware Enhanced RISC Instructions) to enhance the security of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) in automotive networks. By leveraging CHERI’s fine-grained memory protection and capability-based access control, the IDS ensures the robust protection of rule configurations against unauthorised access and manipulation. Experimental results demonstrate a 100% detection rate for spoofed IP packets and unauthorised rule modification attempts. The CHERI-enabled IDS framework achieves latency well within the acceptable limits defined by automotive standards for real-time applications, ensuring it remains suitable for safety-critical operations. The implementation on the ARM Morello board highlights CHERI’s practical applicability and low-latency performance in real-world automotive scenarios. This research underscores the potential of hardware-enforced memory safety in mitigating complex cyber threats and provides a scalable solution for securing increasingly connected and autonomous vehicles. Future work will focus on optimising CHERI for resource-constrained environments and expanding its applications to broader automotive security use cases.

Five years ago, we presented “Automotive Penetration Testing with Scapy” at TROOPERS19—a talk that quickly became one of the most-watched sessions on the TROOPERS YouTube channel. In the intervening years, the automotive domain has evolved significantly, particularly in the realm of **Automotive Ethernet** (e.g., 100/1000BASE-T1). Modern vehicles now rely heavily on protocols like **Diagnostics over IP (DoIP)**, **SOME/IP**, and **AUTOSAR PDUs**, combined with sophisticated security approaches and **Over-the-Air (OTA)** update mechanisms. In this fresh deep dive, we revisit the automotive Ethernet security landscape, illustrating how **Scapy** has adapted to accommodate these emerging protocols and testing scenarios. We will demonstrate advanced techniques, including restbus simulations for SOME/IP, emulating malicious OTA update servers, and exploring cutting-edge features in UDS—such as authentication services—all through carefully crafted packet injection and analysis.

This study examines the automation of converting Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA) data into the openXSAM format within the automotive industry, addressing the growing need for cybersecurity in modern, interconnected vehicles. By leveraging both qualitative and quantitative research methods, the study identifies challenges in data standardization, evaluates current practices, and explores the potential of automation to streamline processes and enhance compliance with ISO/SAE 21434 and UNECE Regulation No. 155. The findings demonstrate that automated data conversion could significantly improve efficiency, data integrity, and interoperability across the automotive supply chain, thereby supporting industry-wide cybersecurity objectives. This research offers valuable insights for automotive engineers, cybersecurity professionals, and policymakers, emphasizing the need for robust tools and collaborative efforts to standardize and automate TARA data processes.