# A Fully Trained Jedi, You are Not

Adam Shostack Secure Our Streets Sept, 2023



# How Many Jedi?



# How Many Jedi?



### We talk a lot about Jedi



How to become a cybersecurity Jedi, Part 4: Three lessons from 'Star Wars: The Last Jedi'



# It's a Bad Goal

- Expectations of heroism drive burnout
- Tearing children from families...
  - ... Forced to live without attachments
- Even so, many people just don't qualify





### About Adam Shostack







# Agenda

- The problem starts with software
- "Shifting left" isn't working
- Reasonable Expectations
  - Bloom
  - Chunking
  - Frames
  - Threats



# We've known for a while...

Axiom 1 (Murphy) All programs are buggy.

**Theorem 1 (Law of Large Programs)** Large programs are even buggier than their size would indicate.

Proof: By inspection.

**Corollary 1.1** A security-relevant program has security bugs.

- Firewalls and Internet Security (Cheswick and Bellovin, 1994)



### Where do bugs come from?

### Soft@vevelopginseers



### Developers introduce problems

- Code with security bugs
- Missing security features
- Unusable security features

















# "Shift Left"

- Build security in
- Changes to how we/they design, develop, deploy
  - Requires new skills
  - Less pen testing
    - More software engineering
- Growing popularity



# Shifting left?



### Shift left implies: Change the development process

- Demands clear responsibilities
- What exactly is changing?
  - Deliverables
  - Tasks
  - Skills
- Risk: Are we doing this to please appsec?



### Clarify

# Who delivers what to whom? How?



# One tool - Bloom's Taxonomy

### **Bloom's Taxonomy**



- Fundamental tool in
- Goals + evaluations



# Bloom's Taxonomy: Remember

#### Bloom's Toyonomu

- Recall facts and basic concepts
  - Define, duplicate, list, repeat
- "Remember data sent over a network can be read by anyone"



# Bloom's Taxonomy: Analyze

#### Bloom's Toyonomu

- Draw connections among ideas
  - Differentiate, organize, relate, compare, contrast, distinguish
- How does authentication relate to authorization?
- How does information disclosure relate to tampering?



# Bloom's Taxonomy: Evaluate

Bloom's Toyonomu

- Justify a stand or decision
  - Argue, defend, judge, select, critique, weigh
- Does encryption protect against that threat?



# Bloom's Taxonomy: Create



- Produce new or original work
  - Design, assemble, investigate



### Tools help us use Bloom to define skills + knowledge

#### **Bloom Question Stems**

#### Remembering

- Make a story map showing the main events.
- Make a time line of your typical day.
- Make a concept map of the topic.
- Write a list of keywords you know about....
- What characters were in the story?
- Make a chart showing...
- Make an acrostic poem about...
- Recite a poem you have learned.

#### **Questions for Remembering**

- What happened after ...?
- How many...?
- What is ...?
- Who was it that ...?
- Name the ...?
- Find the definition of...
- Describe what happened after...
- Who spoke to ...?
- Which is true or false ...?

The Helpful Hundred – Planning for Instruction							
Smaldino, Lowther, and Russell (2008) suggest 100 verbs that highlight performance. Each of these verbs is observable and measurable, making them work quite well in writing objectives for learning. This is not to say that these 100 verbs are the only ones are can be used effectively; however, they provide a great reference.							
add	compute	drill	label	predict	state		
alphabetize	conduct	estimate	locate	prepare	subtract		
analyze	construct	evaluate	make	present	suggest		
apply	contrast	explain	manipulate	produce	swing		
arrange	convert	extrapolate	match	pronounce	tabulate		
assemble	correct	fit	measure	read	throw		
attend	cut	generate	modify	reconstruct	time		
bisect	deduce	graph	multiply	reduce	translate		
build	defend	grasp	name	remove	type		
cave	define	grind	operate	revise	underline		
categorize	demonstrate	hit	order	select	verbalize		
choose	derive	hold	organize	sketch	verify		
classify	describe	identify	outline	ski	weave		
color	design	illustrate	pack	solve	weigh		
compare	designate	indicate	paint	sort	write		
complete	diagram	install	plot	specify			
compose	distinguish	kick	position	square			
Source: Sma	aldino, S. E., Lo	owther, D. L., 8	k Russell, J. D.	(2008). Instruc	ctional Media		

Source: Smaldino, S. E., Lowther, D. L., & Russell, J. D. (2008). Instructional Media O and fechnologies for Learning (9th ed). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson.



### But instead... we teach like this?





### Criteria + constraints

- Align to job, aspirations
- Within reasonable training time
- Goals
  - Help people find, follow paved roads
  - Recognize danger signs

What fits here?







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# Chunking is crucial

- Our brains are really, really good at pattern recognition
  - Dealing with information in "chunks"
- Short term memory is 7 +/- 2 chunks
- 1,1,2,3,5,8,13,34,55...
- If we don't define the chunks, our students will
  - (They may anyway!)



# Categories and frames

- Exploit techniques?
- Threat actors?
- Compliance?
- Cyberwar?
- Top ten?
- Threats?



# **"What can go wrong"** focuses our attention on threats



### "What can go wrong?" is a powerful framing question

- Everyone has an answer if you ask and encourage
  - Across industries, technical skill, execs
- Variants
  - "What keeps you up at night?"
  - "How would you attack this"
  - Fortunately/unfortunately game



# "What can go wrong?" is an umbrella

- Open ended is easier to answer, but answers vary a lot
- Structures
  - Finance execs ... ORX
  - Security ... OWASP top ten
  - FDA .... inability to update
  - Compliance... see my Threat Modeling Compliance (BHAsia '21)
- Flaws, not bugs



# What's the single best toolset?

- 4 ways to do a side task?
- I have to analyze, compare, evaluate?
  - Those are expert tasks!
- So people need experts to offer specific advice





# Single best tool need: Personal finance example

• Max out your tax advantaged, matched accounts...

50?!?!!

50 Personal Finance Tips That Will Change the Way You Think About Money

by <u>Alden Wicker</u>



• Target date funds



# What does every engineer need to know?

- The question is catalyzed by a few projects
  - Fast, Cheap + Good: An Unusual Tradeoff (whitepaper)
  - Threats: What Every Engineer Should Learn from Star Wars
  - Nothing Is Good Enough
- All of which started with a simple question...

Whitepaper available now Shostack.org/whitepapers/ |Others forthcoming: Wiley, Feb, 2022 — IEEE S+P Magazine, Jan/Feb 2023



### A simple question

### Is every flaw unique?



Another simple question

# Do flaws cluster? What do we need to know to find them?



### Where are the flaws? (1)

System Knowledge Required

Security Expertise Required



### Where are the flaws? (2)



Security Expertise Required



### Maybe they're easy to find?



Security Expertise Required



If lightweight flaws are common, we should transform how we work with engineers



# Why do lightweight flaws exist?

- Developers stink?
- Bad tools? (Languages, scanners)
- Lack of knowledge?



# What developers need to know: Framework

- My proposal:
  - STRIDE threats
    - (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Info disclose, DoS, Expansion of Authority)
  - Parsing + predictability generate danger
  - Kill chains bring these together



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- Code issues underly many (most?) security issues
- Shifting left is an admirable goal
- Only works when we're clear about change



# A possible future

- Normal levels of security are defined
- Developers able to build more secure systems
- Less rework, fewer escalations, more predictable delivery



# Thank you!



# Questions? adam@shostack.org

